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1 Introduction 
The UK negotiated its rebate on EU contributions in 1984: 
the justification for this was primarily the UK’s low level of 
receipt of CAP subsidies. Since then, successive UK 
governments have stoutly defended the rebate. The 
expansion of the EU to 25 members, and the improved 
relative wealth of the UK in the EU, have led to 
considerable pressure from other member states for the 
“cheque Britannique” to be scrapped. The question of the 
UK rebate is therefore now very near the top of the EU 
political agenda. 
 
In this paper we argue that there is a continuing need for 
some form of rebate mechanism to iron out anomalies in 
the funding of the EU, but that the particular form of 
mechanism used to pay the UK a rebate has had severely 
adverse consequences, and needs to be reformed. 
Specifically, we argue that the current form of rebate paid 
to the UK has had perverse incentive effects, which go a 
long way towards explaining the UK’s semi-detached 
relationship with the EU. 
 
We also argue that the reformed proposals for the rebate 
put forward by the European Commission in July 2004 do 
not provide a satisfactory solution. Instead, we suggest 
another approach to reform: short of reform of the 
expenditure side, we argue that this is virtually the only 
possible solution to the problem consistent with the twin 
requirements for equity and for the need not to distort 
incentives. 
 
The paper is primarily concerned with the effects of rebates 
at the level of interaction between member states and the 
EU. However there are certain important implications for 
Scotland, and the paper also covers these in its final 
section. In that section we argue that the operation of the 
UK rebate has interacted with the public expenditure 
regime in operation in the UK to produce anomalous effects 
in Scotland which are even more perverse than those 
experienced in the UK as a whole. We demonstrate how 
the general approach to the rebate question advocated in 
this paper could readily be adapted to correct these effects. 
2 The origins of the UK rebate 
2.1 The origins of the current UK rebate go back to a 
general principle enumerated at the 1984 Fontainebleau 
European Council, to the effect that: 
 
“Any member state sustaining a budgetary burden 
which is excessive in relation to its relative prosperity 
may benefit from a correction at the appropriate time.” 
(As quoted in Commission Document COM (2004)505: 
Technical Annex: Funding the EU). 
 
This is a useful statement of principle which, we take it, 
would still command general support. We interpret this 
principle to mean that the net contribution of each member 
state should ideally relate in some appropriate fashion to a 
suitable measure of relative prosperity, like GNP or GDP, 
where, to allow for scale effects, both the net contribution 
and the GDP or GNP measures are expressed on a per 
capita basis. 
 
2.2 It became clear immediately after the UK’s accession to 
the EC that there were particular features which meant that 
this principle was violated in the case of the UK. 
Specifically, 
 
a. The UK had an agricultural sector which was relatively 
smaller and structurally different from those of other 
member states, resulting in lower CAP spending in the 
UK. 
 
b. The UK made a proportionately larger contribution to 
the funding of the Community, due to the fact that the 
UK had a relatively higher share of the VAT 
harmonised base than of the total GNP of the 
Community. 
 
The effect of these features was that, by the mid 1980s, 
and in the absence of any rebate mechanism, the UK 
would have made a net contribution to the EC which, as a 
percentage of GNP, would have been the largest in the 
Community - despite the fact that the UK had the third 
lowest level of GDP per head in the Community. 
 
2.3 To overcome this anomaly, it was agreed at 
Fontainebleau that the UK should be paid a rebate 
essentially equal to 66% of the net contribution it would 
have paid in the absence of a rebate mechanism: this is 
paid for by contributions from other member states. In fact, 
the actual rules for the calculation of the rebate have 
become progressively more complicated through time for 
two main reasons: 
 
a. As the own resource system has been progressively 
modified, with greater emphasis being put on GDP in 
calculating gross contributions, it has been necessary 
for the Commission, in calculating the UK contribution, 
to neutralise each of these modifications in order to 
work back to what the UK would have paid if the 
budgetary rules of 1985 were still in operation. 
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b. Rebates on the extra amounts which other member 
states have to pay to fund the UK rebate have been 
introduced to reduce the burden on Germany, the 
Netherlands, Austria, and Sweden. 
 
For the purposes of the present paper, it is sufficient to 
describe the UK rebate as if it were still calculated in its 
original pure and simple form: that is, two thirds of the UK’s 
unrebated net contribution. This assumption does not affect 
any of the principles involved: but greatly simplifies the 
presentation of the argument. 
2.4 In essence, suppose that, before the rebate: - 
The gross contribution of the UK = G 
Receipts to UK from EU = E 
The net contribution would therefore be = G - E. 
The effect of the rebate is to give the UK a refund, where 
rebate = 0.66*(G - E) 
Therefore, 
the net contribution of UK to the EU = 0.33*(G - E) 
 
(In actual fact, the rebate is paid in arrears: however, this 
simplified exposition captures the essentials of the 
situation). 
 
 
3 Performance of the Rebate Since 1985 
3.1 In terms of its primary function, of reducing the UK’s net 
annual contribution, the rebate has operated as intended. 
As calculated by the Commission itself, (Technical Annex 
as above), in the absence of any correction mechanisms, 
the UK would have been on average the largest net 
contributor over the seven years to 2003, and they estimate 
the UK would remain as such over the period to 2013. 
 
3.2 What has changed significantly since 1984, however, 
has been the relative wealth of the UK compared to other 
members of the EU. Whereas in 1984 the UK was the third 
poorest member of the EC in terms of GDP per head, the 
UK is now one of the wealthier members of the Community. 
The UK’s relative standing depends on the precise 
measure used: but in terms of GDP per head, (on a 
purchasing power parity basis), the UK was the sixth 
wealthiest member of the EU in 2003 (source: Eurostat 
Yearbook, 2004): and in terms of GNI per head, (as quoted 
in the Commission Technical Annex), the UK was 
assessed to be the wealthiest. 
 
3.3 Chart 1 shows the net contributions per head of each 
member in 2003 (after the UK rebate), plotted against GDP 
per head: (the sources of these figures are (i) for net 
contributions, European DG Budget, Commission Services, 
and (ii) for per capita GDP, Eurostat Yearbook 2004). If the 
UK were not to have its rebate, the effect would be, 
approximately, to treble the UK’s net contribution per head: 
which would put the UK in the position of being the highest 
net contributor per head. As it stands, the Chart shows that 
countries like Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands, 
which are of comparable wealth to the UK, are in fact 
making higher net contributions per head. These countries 
could argue, with some justification, that the effect of the 
existing rebate is now to overcompensate the UK relative to 
their positions. 
 
(As an aside from the main theme of this paper, it can be 
seen from Chart 1 that the country with the most 
anomalous funding position is Ireland, which receives the 
largest net amount per head of any country in the EU, 
despite now being one of the wealthiest countries on a 
GDP per head basis. This is relevant to the debate about 
the contributory factors to Ireland’s recent economic 
success.) 
 
3.4 Looking to the future, the Commission estimate that, if 
the current rebate rules are not changed, the effect of the 
enlargement of the EU would be to increase the average 
UK rebate by more than 50% compared with the average 
over the past seven years. The effect would be that the UK 
would become the smallest net contributor to the EU 
budget along with Finland. (Ref: Technical Annex as 
above). 
 
3.5 To summarise, therefore: 
 
a. If the UK rebate were scrapped, the UK would become 
the largest net contributor over the foreseeable future. 
 
b. If the rebate were retained unchanged, the UK would 
become the smallest net contributor. 
 
Failing a complete overhaul of the expenditure patterns of 
the EU, (in particular of the CAP), the above facts in 
themselves present a strong argument, not for scrapping 
the UK rebate, but for modifications to the rebate 
mechanism. In fact, however, the case for reform of the 
rebate system is even stronger than this, once the harmful 
effects of the perverse incentives built into the current 
rebate mechanism are also taken into account - particularly 
the harmful effects on the UK itself. These perverse 
incentive effects are analysed in the next section. 
 
 
4 The perverse incentive effects of the current UK 
rebate 
4.1 This section examines the operation of the rebate in 
more detail, and identifies perverse effects which the 
Fontainebleau mechanism has on the UK’s attitudes to the 
EU. 
 
4.2 Looking at the operation of the rebate from a UK 
viewpoint, consider the UK’s likely attitude to a new EU 
policy proposal: (that is, we are concerned at this point in 
the paper with policies at the proposal stage, when they are 
being discussed and refined before possible 
implementation.) 
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Suppose that the UK, before rebate, contributes a fraction 
s of any extra Community expenditure: (this fraction s is 
based upon the UK’s share of the Community’s wealth). 
 
Suppose also that, for the particular policy proposal under 
consideration, the UK would attract a share e of the 
Community expenditure on the policy. 
 
It is also assumed that there is a requirement for a 100% 
matched funding for this type of expenditure: (that is, for 
every £1 received from the EU in support of the project, the 
UK must match this with a further £1 to be spent in the UK 
on the project). 
 
Suppose that this particular new policy will represent a cost 
of X on the Community budget. Consider first of all what 
the implications would be for the UK in the absence of the 
UK rebate.  In these circumstances, given the above 
assumptions, the additional cost to the UK in terms of the 
increase in the UK’s gross contribution would be sX, and 
the funding received from the EU would be eX. Allowing for 
matched funding the total expenditure in the UK arising 
from the new policy would therefore be 2eX. Therefore the 
cost to the UK is sX +eX, (that is, the cost of the increase 
in gross contribution plus the requirement for matched 
funding): the extra expenditure in the UK is 2eX: and hence 
the proportion of the extra expenditure in the UK funded by 
the UK is 
proportion given by formula (2) will fall as e gets larger. 
Since the maximum value of e is 1, which is when all EU 
expenditure for a policy is allocated to the UK, it therefore 
follows that the minimum value of this function will be when 
e=1. Plugging in the current UK values of r and s, (namely 
r = 0.66 and s = 0.16), then the minimum proportion of 
extra expenditure which will actually be funded by the UK is 
0.86. That is for every £1 spent on such an EU approved 
and supported project in the UK, 86 pence of the 
expenditure will be provided by the UK. 
 
4.4 What this shows is that, with the rebate mechanism 
operating, even in the most favourable case (when all of 
the expenditure on a proposed policy would be allocated to 
the UK), the UK would still end up funding over 85% of the 
additional expenditure in the UK from its own resources. Of 
course, for all real world policies the UK share of the EU 
budget allocation, e, will be very much less than 1, which 
means that the extra cost to the UK as proportion of the 
increase in expenditure in the UK will be greater than 0.86. 
 
For values of e below a certain point the proportion in 
formula 2 will be greater than 1: that is, the UK will pay out 
more as a result of the policy than is spent on the policy in 
the UK. This point occurs when e = s, and this is 
irrespective of the value of r. 
 
4.5 We now want to use formula (2) to explore how the 
presence or absence of the current rebate is likely to affect 
sX + eX 
= 
 
0.5  + 
s 
. …….(1) 
UK behaviour in its approach to new EU policy proposals. 
This is best illustrated graphically: the relevant chart is 
2eX 2e 
 
Now consider what happens when there is a rebate in 
operation. Since it is useful to express the operation of the 
mechanism algebraically, it is assumed that the UK rebate 
factor is r: that is, that the UK is given as a rebate a 
proportion r of the difference between its gross contribution 
and the EU programme funding which it receives: (at 
Fontainebleau, the rebate factor r was set at 0.66). 
 
In these circumstances, Extra Cost to UK as proportion of 
increase in expenditure in UK = 0.5*(1+r) + 0.5*(1- 
r)*(s/e)……..(2) 
 
(this formula is derived in the attached Annex). 
 
It should be emphasised that what this formula shows is 
the extra cost to the UK as a result of the introduction of the 
new programme, (which will consist of the increase in the 
UK’s rebated gross contribution, plus matched funding in 
the UK), expressed as a proportion of the total expenditure 
on the programme on the ground in the UK, (that is, 
receipts from the EU for the programme, plus matched 
funding.) 
 
4.3 The first thing to note is that when there is no rebate, 
that is when r =0, formula (2) does indeed agree with 
formula (1) as we would expect. Note also that the 
Chart 2. One curve in Chart 2, (marked “with rebate”), 
shows how the proportion of extra UK expenditure funded 
by UK varies with e, assuming r is fixed at 0.66, and s 
takes its current value of 0.16. In the other curve, (marked 
“without rebate”), r is set at 0. 
 
Without the rebate, when confronted with a range of new 
policy options, one would, of course, expect a country to 
support strongly those options for which e is likely to be 
greater than s for that country: for such policies, the 
country gets back more than it puts in, and the proportion 
of the extra expenditure in the country actually funded by 
the country will be less than 1. For countries which are net 
contributors to the EU, however, most new policy proposals 
are likely to have e values for the country which are less 
than the country’s s value: so the introduction of most new 
policies will cost the country more than the benefit it will 
receive. But as can be seen from Chart 2, the slope of the 
“without rebate” curve rapidly becomes very steep for e < 
s: in this area of the curve, even relatively small variations 
in the e values between different policies will make a big 
difference in how expensive the policy is for the country, 
relative to the benefit it will receive. The country will 
therefore have a strong incentive to participate actively in 
the debate about the choice of new EU policies. In other 
words, when there is no rebate, net contributor countries 
are likely to be active participants in the policy formulation 
process in the EU. 
Pages 45-52 
Contrast this with the position faced by the UK, operating 
on the “with rebate” curve in Chart 2. First of all, (unlike the 
case of no rebate), where e > s the “with rebate” curve 
does not go down much below 1, so there is no prospect of 
the UK securing (perhaps by a process of horse trading), 
the implementation of an occasional policy which will be 
highly favourable for the UK: as we have already seen, 
even for the most favourable policy the cost to the UK will 
be at least 86% of the extra expenditure in the UK. In 
addition, in the range where most policy proposals will 
arise, where e<s for the UK, the “with rebate” curve is 
relatively flat: such policies will cost the UK more than it 
gets back, but the flatness of the curve means that the UK 
has little incentive to attempt to discriminate between such 
policies. These circumstances, therefore, are a recipe for a 
country in the UK’s position to adopt a policy of 
indifference, if not general hostility, to all new policy 
proposals: rather than being an active participant in the 
policy debate. 
 
Faced with these characteristics of the rebated reward 
function (see Chart 2), it is perhaps not surprising that the 
UK is often perceived as being unenthusiastic about any 
new EU policies. We suggest that much of the UK’s 
appearance of being semi-detached from the EU policy 
making process is likely to be explicable in terms of the 
perverse incentive effect, as analysed here, implicit in the 
UK rebate mechanism. 
 
4.6 We now turn to UK behaviour as regards certain 
existing programmes. There is a further perverse incentive 
effect of the rebate mechanism, which operates for certain 
established programmes, (as opposed to policies which are 
which are just at the proposal stage). 
 
Some EU programmes are discretionary, in the sense that 
it is up to the government of the individual member state to 
decide whether they want to participate in the programme, 
or to what extent they wish to participate. For example, in 
the agriculture area, rural development schemes intended 
to assist modernisation, to assist young farmers to start up, 
and to provide compensation for less favoured areas, are 
discretionary. 
 
From the point of view of an individual government, the 
decision whether to participate in such a discretionary 
programme is like, (in the terminology of paragraph 4.2 
above), a proposed new policy with e = 1, since if the 
government decides to participate, all of the project funding 
resulting from the decision to participate will come to the 
country. The proportion of the expenditure in the country 
which will be funded by the country is therefore given by 
formula 2 with e=1. So if the UK decides to participate in an 
existing discretionary programme, then with the rebate in 
place the UK will actually fund 86% of the expenditure in 
the UK: (this is the result of substituting e=1, r=0.66, and 
s=0.16 in formula 2): while if there were no rebate, the UK 
would fund only 58% of the expenditure itself: (formula 2 
with e=1, r=0, and s=0.16). 
The difference between these two figures, 86% and 58%, is 
likely to have a very marked effect on the UK’s willingness 
to engage in discretionary programmes. In the no rebate 
case, with the EU funding almost half of any discretionary 
expenditure in the UK, there would be a strong incentive for 
the UK to participate. But with the rebate, the EU will only 
fund 14%. Given that the programme might not represent 
the UK’s top policy priority, the UK may well feel that it is 
not worth losing the flexibility to spend part of its rebate as 
it sees fit, if the only benefit is going to be the 14% funding 
provided by the EU. This mechanism is likely to explain 
why the UK’s take up of some discretionary programmes 
has historically been very low. 
 
In the Scottish context, the above is likely to have a bearing 
on the decision by the UK government not to pursue 
structural funding in 2003 to support the fishing industry, a 
decision which appeared puzzling to many commentators 
at the time. 
 
4.7 The analysis presented in this section provides further 
strong arguments for the reform of the rebate system. 
However, it does more than that. If indeed, as we suggest, 
the UK’s involvement in Europe has been severely 
damaged by the perverse effects of the current system, 
then this surely provides a strong incentive for the UK to 
agree to reform, provided the reformed system gives the 
UK the advantages of an appropriate reduction in net 
contributions, without the disadvantages inherent in the 
current form of the rebate function. 
 
 
5 Designing an improved system of rebates 
5.1 The ideal solution to the rebate problem would be to do 
away with the need for rebates by reforming the 
expenditure programmes of the EU - particularly CAP. This 
approach is indeed stated as being the preferred long-term 
option in the report of the European Council, Conclusions 
of Presidency, June 1984. Realistically, however, this ideal 
is unlikely to be achieved within the foreseeable future: so 
what is required is a reformed system of rebates. 
 
5.2 From the preceding analysis, the requirements which a 
reformed rebate system would have to meet are fairly clear. 
These are as follows: 
 
a. In line with the basic principle outlined in paragraph 
2.1, rebates should operate so as to bring each 
country’s net contribution per head into some 
appropriate relationship with a measure of the 
country’s net wealth per head. This implies, in 
particular, that a principle of equity should hold: 
countries with similar wealth should make similar net 
contributions per head. 
 
b. Countries should automatically drop in and out of the 
rebate system as their circumstances change. 
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c. The system should be free from perverse incentives. 
As we have seen above, the major perverse incentives 
for the UK arise because marginal changes in the 
UK’s unrebated net contribution are largely cancelled 
out by immediate changes in the rebate the UK 
receives. To remove perverse incentives from the 
system, therefore, this means that the rebate received 
by a country should not be a function of marginal 
variations in the country’s unrebated net contribution. 
 
5.3 In July 2004, the Commission put forward its own 
proposals for reform of the rebate system: in summary, 
these were that: 
 
Æ    when a member state makes a net contribution of 
more than 0.35% of its GNI, it should receive a rebate. 
Æ    all net contributions exceeding 0.35% of GNI would be 
refunded at 66%. 
Æ    there is a limit on the size of the total refund. 
 
These proposals broadly meet criteria (a) and (b) in 
paragraph 5.2. However, and crucially, since the rebate 
would be related to the size of the unrebated net 
contribution, with the same rebate factor of 0.66 as 
currently applies to the British rebate, the Commission’s 
proposals fail the test of not building in perverse incentives. 
In fact, the Commission’s proposals would extend the 
perverse incentives which currently apply to the UK to 
probably seven net contributors on the basis of the 
forecasts in the Commission’s technical Annex. For this 
reason, we strongly suggest that implementation of the 
Commission’s proposals would have very adverse 
consequences for the European Union. 
 
5.4 So is it possible to design a rebate system which does 
come close to meeting the requirements in paragraph 5.2. 
We suggest that this is possible, but that, for the following 
reasons, the available options are in fact very limited. 
 
Consider requirement 5.2c first of all- that the size of the 
rebate is independent of marginal variations in a country’s 
unrebated net contribution. The only way that this 
requirement can be met is if a country’s rebate is, in the 
short to medium term, independent of changes in that 
countries unrebated net contribution: or, in other words, if 
each country’s rebate is fixed in the short to medium term. 
 
On the other hand, rebates which are fixed in the longer 
term are clearly not going to meet the requirement that 
countries should go in and out of rebate as their 
circumstances change: and, even if they are appropriately 
assessed to begin with, are going to “wander off” as times 
change. 
These considerations suggest a system of rebates which 
are fixed in the medium term, (and what the medium term 
should be is a good question, to which we return below), 
but are subject to periodical revision. 
More specifically, the proposed system would operate as 
follows: 
 
 
a. There would be an agreed view as to what the 
appropriate underlying relationship should be between 
a measure of per capita wealth, and a country’s net 
per capita contribution: for reasons to be set out in the 
next section, it would be advantageous if this 
relationship was linear. This same common 
relationship would be applied to all countries. 
 
b. At the start of the system, an adjustment would be 
calculated for each country as a fixed sum, to bring 
each country’s net contribution after the adjustment 
into line with the desired underlying relationship. To 
avoid distortions, it would probably be appropriate to 
calculate this adjustment on the basis of a few years’ 
data. 
 
c. This adjustment would then be maintained, as a 
constant for each country, through the medium term. 
Since the adjustment is fixed, each country would then 
be able to benefit fully from any extra EU funding it 
received, so avoiding the perverse incentive effects 
experienced with the current UK rebate. 
 
d. At a fixed interval, every so many years, the 
adjustments would be recalculated, and the process 
would start again. The decision on how long this fixed 
interval should be would involve striking a balance. If 
the interval is too short, then negative incentive effects 
will increasingly come into play: if too long, then some 
countries will have moved too far into anomalous 
positions, given differences in relative growth rates 
etc. As an initial judgement, a review period in the 
range six to ten years is probably appropriate. 
 
5.5 There is one further modification to this system which it 
would be worthwhile to introduce. Where there are certain 
categories of EU funded expenditure which are regarded 
as being so important from an overall strategic EU 
viewpoint that it is desired to give them extra 
encouragement, then these categories could be exempted 
from the basic calculation of the net contribution in the first 
place, before the rebate adjustments were set. For 
example, one such category is likely to be EU funding in 
support of Research and Development. In this case, a 
country which was a particularly large recipient of EU R&D 
funding would not lose its right to receive a rebate, just 
because of the R&D funding it received. 
 
5.6 As explained above, it appears that a rebate system 
along the above lines follows inescapably from the criteria 
in paragraph 5.2 above: accordingly, we suggest a system 
along these lines should be considered for implementation. 
Pages 45-52 
6 The interaction of the UK rebate with the 
particular circumstances of Scotland 
6.1 The main source of funding for the Scottish Parliament is 
its block grant from the UK Exchequer. Changes to this block 
grant are determined by the Barnett formula, which gives 
Scotland its per capita share of the planned changes in the 
corresponding expenditure programmes in England, 
primarily, Education, Health, and parts of Trade and Industry 
and Transport.) 
 
6.2 The way the Barnett formula operates as regards EU 
funding is that Scotland does not directly get any increase in 
its block grant if extra EU funds are allocated to Scotland: 
EU funds are regarded as going to the UK 
Treasury, and the receipt by the Treasury of extra EU funds on 
behalf of Scotland does not in itself generate any 
change to Scotland’s block grant. Only if EU funds also go to 
England, and if these funds then generate a change in 
planned expenditure in England, will Scotland get a Barnett 
consequential of the funding change in England. Since in 
many cases EU funds will be allocated to Scotland for 
reasons which have no direct English counterparts, this 
means that in effect Scotland is largely insulated from receipt 
of EU funds. In practice, Scotland is expected to fund EU 
projects, that is both the direct funding and the matched 
funding component, out of its existing block grant, council 
taxes and non-domestic rates. 
 
The way in which the Barnett formula interacts with EU 
funding does not appear to be widely understood in 
Scotland. The point was very well appreciated in Wales, 
however, when 63% of the area of Wales was granted 
Objective 1 status in 2000, but Wales stood in danger of 
having to fund this out of its existing grant: as a result, 
Wales negotiated a special concession from the Treasury to 
enable the Welsh block grant to be adjusted for the receipt 
of EU funds, (although Wales still had to find the required 
match funding out of its existing grant.) This contrasts with 
what happened when the Highlands and Islands in Scotland 
achieved Objective 1 status in the 
1990’s, but Scotland had to fund all of the resulting 
expenditure out of an unadjusted block grant. 
 
6.3 It is at this point that the relevance of the UK rebate 
comes in. Since, as we have argued above, the negative 
incentives of the UK rebate mechanism act to dampen UK 
participation in EU programmes, this in turn is likely to 
dampen the extent of any EU related changes in English 
spending programmes from which Barnett consequentials 
could be generated. The interaction of the two systems, 
Barnett and the UK rebate, is therefore likely to further 
insulate Scotland from the possibility of actually obtaining 
any additional funding resulting from EU policies. 
 
6.4 What are the implications for this state of affairs of the 
changes we have proposed above to the EU rebate 
mechanism. These are as follows: 
 
Suppose that an amended rebate system has been 
introduced, along the lines proposed in 5.4 above, and that, 
as proposed in 5.4(a), the basic underlying relationship 
between net contribution per head and GDP per head is 
linear, that is, 
 
net contribution per head = a + b* GDP per head: 
 
this is equivalent to 
 
net contribution = a * population + b* GDP 
 
Now both of the independent variables in this expression, 
population and GDP, can be disaggregated geographically. 
So in principle, instead of working out the required rebate 
at EU member country, the calculation could equivalently 
be carried out at a lower NUTS level - in this case at 
Scotland level. (It is precisely for this reason, so that the 
funding and rebate calculations can be disaggregated to 
lower geographic levels, that we recommended in 5.4(a) 
that the basic underlying relationship between net 
contribution per head and GDP per head should be linear.) 
 
It would not, however, be enough just to calculate rebates 
at a lower geographical level than member state. The EU 
would also have to insist that each member had 
transparent public expenditure control systems in place to 
demonstrate that the rebate, and also EU programme 
funding, were allocated in a genuinely additional fashion at 
the lower geographic level. For the UK, this would require 
radical revision to the Barnett formula. But if the required 
changes were implemented, this would have the effect of 
revolutionising the impact of EU funding and EU 
membership for areas like Scotland, and would make sure 
that EU policies were actively pursued, were genuinely 
additional, and hence were really effective in such areas. 
We suggest, therefore, that serious consideration should 
be given to the implementation of the following changes, if 
an amended system of rebates is introduced: namely that: 
 
a. The new system of rebates should be calculated 
where appropriate at sub-member state level. 
 
b. Systems of public finance within member states should 
be reformed so that EU rebates and funding below 
member state level can be seen to be genuinely 
additional and transparent. 
 
 
Annex: The Algebra of the UK Rebate: Derivation 
of Formula in Paragraph 4.2 
1. Suppose the UK pays gross contribution G before 
rebate and receives European funding of E. 
 
In fact, the UK gets a rebate of r(G - E). 
 
So, the UK can be regarded as actually paying 
G - r(G - E) = (1-r)G + rE, 
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and in return receiving benefit in the form of EU project 
funding of E. 
 
2. Now suppose that there is a new policy, costing X at 
Community level, for which the UK will pay sX gross, 
and receive back eX in funding. 
 
Then the UK’s new gross contribution (before rebate) 
is G+ sX, and European funding received by the UK is 
E + eX. 
After rebate, the UK will pay, as implied by the formula 
Allowing for matched funding of 100%, the extra 
expenditure which will take place in the UK is 2eX. 
The extra cost to the UK is the matched funding plus 
the change in the rebated gross contribution: that is 
 
eX + (1 - r)sX + reX =  (1 + r)eX  + (1 - r)sX 
 
So, of the extra expenditure of 2eX taking place in the 
UK as a result of the new policy, the proportion which 
will actually be funded by the UK is 
in 1 above, 
(1 - r) (G + sX) + r(E + eX) , 
so the change in the UK’s rebated gross contribution is 
(1-r)sX + reX. 
(1 + r)eX + (1 - r)sX 
= 
2eX 
 
which is the required formula. 
(1 + r) 
+ 
2 
(1 - r)s 
, 
2e 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 1: Net Contribution per Head against GDP per head: 2003 
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Chart 2: Proportion of extra UK expenditure funded by the UK, with rebate and without rebate: see paragraph  4.5 
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